Language and Godels Theorem

The monograph is a 'de-construction' of Kurt Godel's Incompleteness Theorem's paradox sentence's used to prove that no formal systems of logic or mathematics can exist. The semantic valuation of the 'meaning' behind the sentences used for the paradox is challenged and revised using other words that change the very nature of the sentences used in the paradox. These 'semantic' changes result in new meanings for the sentences used for the paradoxes and forms new interpretations of examining Godel's Incompleteness Theorem as it related to David Hilbert's unifying plan for a Formalized mathematics. The monograph includes an unpublished paper on the reason 'why' behind the writing of this monograph in the Appendix section as well as a copy of my original mathematics dissertation from which this monograph is derived that is also located in the Appendix section of this monograph. The monograph includes a chapter on 'machine intelligence' and is a culmination of my thoughts on language, machines and artificial intelligence as a whole. Technical papers on the subject are included in the Appendix section of this monograph. Content: Abstract, Preface, Introduction, The Incompleteness Theorem, Hilbert's Axiomatic System for Mathematics, Of Two Words, Language and Godel's Theorem, Can Machines Think?, Conclusions, Summary, References, Notes, Appendix and Index.