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Necessary Beings

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Bob Hale presents a broadly Fregean approach to metaphysics, according to which ontology and modality are mutually dependent upon one another. He argues that facts about what kinds of things exist depend on facts about what is possible. Modal facts are fundamental, and have their basis in the essences of things--not in meanings or concepts.
Hardback
336 Pages
03-October-2013
$126.79
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Bob Hale presents an original analysis of what is required for the existence of entities of various kinds, arguing that ontology and modality are mutually dependent upon one another: questions about what kinds of things there are cannot be properly understood without recourse to considerations about possibility and necessity, and questions about the nature and basis of necessity and possibility cannot be tackled without drawing on the methodology of ontology. He argues that facts about what kinds of things exist depend on facts about what is possible, which means that at least some facts are fundamental--nonreducible to other, non-modal sorts of facts. They have their basis in the natures or essences of things--not in meanings or concepts.
Product Details
ISBN-13
9780199669578
Publisher
Oxford University Press UK
Published
03-October-2013
Format
Hardback
Pages
336

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$126.79
Ships in 3-5 business days

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Necessary Beings

$126.79

Description

Bob Hale presents an original analysis of what is required for the existence of entities of various kinds, arguing that ontology and modality are mutually dependent upon one another: questions about what kinds of things there are cannot be properly understood without recourse to considerations about possibility and necessity, and questions about the nature and basis of necessity and possibility cannot be tackled without drawing on the methodology of ontology. He argues that facts about what kinds of things exist depend on facts about what is possible, which means that at least some facts are fundamental--nonreducible to other, non-modal sorts of facts. They have their basis in the natures or essences of things--not in meanings or concepts.