Inferentialism and Practical Reason

This essay elaborates and defends a certain broad orientation in the philosophy of mind-the inferentialism of Sellars and Brandom-and explores the striking consequences of that orientation for the field of practical reason. Inferentialism aims to understand the significance of various philosophically important concepts in terms of their role in inference. The first part of the essay draws a distinction between two types of practical reasoning. It is argued that once we take a contextualist, non-foundationalist approach to practical reasoning, we realize that neither form of reasoning is more fundamental or primary than the other. The second part examines three important practically-oriented mental states: intentions, evaluative beliefs, and desires, and arrives at novel accounts of each. Intentions are analyzed as practical commitments, the linchpin of practical reasoning, and their deep connection with beliefs is revealed. Desires are understood in terms of intentions, reversing the usual direction of analysis, while evaluative beliefs are approached via a distinction between acknowledging and attributing practical states.