Scepticism and Reliable Belief

José L. Zalabardo assesses the main arguments against the possibility of knowledge, and challenges their consensus. He articulates and defends a reliabilist theory of knowledge that belongs firmly in the truth-tracking tradition. He argues that this account of knowledge has the resources for blocking the main standard lines of sceptical reasoning--including the regress argument, arguments based on sceptical hypotheses, and the problem of the criterion. But although the theory can be used to refute the standard lines of sceptical reasoning, there is a sceptical argument against which the theory offers no defence, as it does not rely on any assumptions that the theory would render illegitimate. Zalabardo explores this argument and its implications, and ends with the suggestion that the problem might have a metaphysical solution: although the sceptical argument may make no illegitimate epistemological assumptions, it does rest on a questionable account of the nature of cognition.