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Anti-Externalism

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Internalism about the mind is the view that your thoughts and sensations are constituted by conditions inside your skin. Externalism denies this, and over the past thirty years has become the dominant view in philosophy of mind. Joseph Mendola argues that the externalist theories are false and develops a viable internalist alternative.
Paperback / softback
28-March-2013
360 Pages
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Internalism in philosophy of mind is the thesis that all conditions that constitute a person's current thoughts and sensations, with their characteristic contents, are internal to that person's skin and contemporaneous. Externalism is the denial of internalism, and is now broadly popular. Joseph Mendola argues that internalism is true, and that there are no good arguments that support externalism. Part I examines famous case-based arguments for externalism due to Kripke, Putnam, and Burge, and develops a unified internalist response incorporating rigidified description clusters. Part II examines theoretical motivations for externalism entwined with causal accounts of perceptual content, and develops an internalist but physicalist account of sensory content involving intentional qualia. Part III examines theoretical motivations for externalism entwined with externalist accounts of language, including work of Brandom, Davidson, and Wittgenstein, and develops an internalist account of thoughts mediated by language.

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RRP: $91.95
$77.00
Ships in 3-5 business days
Hurry up! Current stock:

Anti-Externalism

RRP: $91.95
$77.00

Description

Internalism in philosophy of mind is the thesis that all conditions that constitute a person's current thoughts and sensations, with their characteristic contents, are internal to that person's skin and contemporaneous. Externalism is the denial of internalism, and is now broadly popular. Joseph Mendola argues that internalism is true, and that there are no good arguments that support externalism. Part I examines famous case-based arguments for externalism due to Kripke, Putnam, and Burge, and develops a unified internalist response incorporating rigidified description clusters. Part II examines theoretical motivations for externalism entwined with causal accounts of perceptual content, and develops an internalist but physicalist account of sensory content involving intentional qualia. Part III examines theoretical motivations for externalism entwined with externalist accounts of language, including work of Brandom, Davidson, and Wittgenstein, and develops an internalist account of thoughts mediated by language.

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